TX Supreme Court Emphasizes Negligence Does Not Always Result in “Negligent”
In a recent opinion issued on June 27, the Supreme Court of Texas emphasized that the presence of negligence does not always lead to liability, and Texas law requires more from those seeking such a finding.
In Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, the court reinforced a basic prerequisite of negligence liability – a defendant’s negligence must be a substantial factor in causing the resulting injury. Participants in the causal chain who merely contribute to the conditions that made an injury possible are not always a substantial factor of the resulting harm and are, therefore, not liable for the damage.
Factual Background
Many may remember the $89 million trucking verdict that came out of Harris County, Texas, in 2018. This Werner verdict could be considered a precursor to many of the high verdicts that now occur throughout Texas.
The Werner case arose from a fatal car crash in Odessa, Texas, in December 2014. The driver of a pickup truck traveling too fast on an icy, divided highway suddenly lost control, hurtled across a 42-foot-wide median, and collided with an 18-wheeler driven by defendant Shiraz Ali. Ali had less than two seconds to react to what was occurring on the other side of the highway. Jennifer Blake and her three children, all passengers in the pickup truck, suffered severe injuries. One of her children tragically passed away as a result of the collision with Ali.
The plaintiffs sued Ali and his employer, Werner Enterprises, in Harris County, Texas, district court. They alleged that Ali was negligent, and that Werner was responsible under the legal doctrine respondeat superior for Ali’s negligence. They further alleged that Werner was independently liable for negligently training and supervising Ali before the incident.
The plaintiffs argued at trial that Ali’s speed, though under the speed limit, was unsafe for the icy conditions. They claimed the incident would not have occurred had Ali been driving slower. The jury agreed and apportioned 84% of fault to Ali and Werner. An en banc panel of the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.
The Chief Justice’s Majority Opinion Unpacks Proximate Cause
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and rendered judgment in favor of Ali and Werner. In sum, the Supreme Court held the pickup truck driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The plaintiffs’ principal theory of the case was that if Ali had not been driving so fast in the icy conditions, the incident would not have occurred, i.e. but for Ali’s speed at the time, the pickup truck would not have collided with the 18-wheeler.
As a quick primer to breaking down negligence in Texas: A plaintiff must prove (along with duty and damages) that a defendant proximately caused an injury. To prove proximate cause, the plaintiff must show that a defendant’s actions were the cause in fact of the injury and that the injury was foreseeable. Going further, cause in fact is broken down into two elements:
- “But for” causation – but for the defendant’s action, the incident would not have occurred
- “Substantial factor” causation – the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury
In Werner, the Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ “traveling too fast” argument only addressed “but-for” causation. The court detailed that Ali’s initial negligence merely created the condition by which the pickup truck driver’s loss of control could bring about the injury. In other words, Ali’s alleged negligence on the other side of the median (traveling too fast) was “the condition that made the harm possible,” but it was not the substantial factor in bringing about the accident itself.
The court held that the substantial factor in bringing about the injury “was the sudden, unexpected hurtling of the victims’ vehicle into oncoming highway traffic, for which the defendants bore no responsibility.” The court explained:
| even if the defendant’s negligence is part of the causal chain of events that led to the injury, the defendant is not liable if his involvement was a mere “happenstance of place and time.” Instead, the substantial-factor requirement means that liability falls only on a party whose substantial role in bringing about the injury is such that he is “actually responsible for the ultimate harm.” |
The court further detailed a bright line definition of “substantial factor” as “the singular fact that substantially explains why the accident happened and who is responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.”
The court boiled the issue down to what is right by reasoning, “[s]ubtantial-factor causations asks, also in light of common experience, whether ‘the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility.’”
Ultimately, the court reasoned the accident would not have occurred unless the pickup truck driver first lost control on the other side of the highway. If Ali had been driving 100 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred. Had either driver been moving slower or faster, the accident would not have occurred. If no vehicle were in the other lane of travel, the accident would not have occurred. If Ali was driving a small car instead of an 18-wheeler, it would likely have been Ali, and not Blake and her children, who were injured. These possibilities highlighted for the court that it was the pickup truck driver, and not Ali, who was the substantial factor in causing the collision.
The court’s majority determined that a new trial was not necessary, because the plaintiffs could never get around the fact that the pickup truck driver was the substantial reason the incident occurred.
Derivative Liability and the Admission Rule
After holding that Ali, and Werner through Ali, were not negligent, the court also grappled with the derivative claims against Werner of negligent training and supervision of Ali. The court majority concluded that the judgment against Werner for these claims could not stand given that Ali did not proximately cause the injuries. The court explained that all claims against Werner were “derivative” of Ali’s liability, regardless of additional theories of liability presented by the plaintiffs.
Notably, Justice Evan Young wrote a concurring opinion that delved further into handling these “derivative” claims against employers. He advocated for the adoption of a rule where, if an employer assumes liability for an employee acting within the course and scope of employment, there should be no separate fault assessment against the employer for claims such as negligent entrustment or negligent hiring.
In several courts of appeal, this has become known as the “admission rule.” Ultimately, Justice Young expressed concern that admitting evidence of alleged negligence of multiple other employees other than the driver who caused the harm risks inflating damages beyond their actual amount or distorting the attribution of liability. He illustrated this point by noting that the inclusion of derivative negligence claims in this case nearly doubled Werner’s percentage of responsibility. When allocating fault between only the two drivers, the jury assigned Ali 45% fault and the other driver 55% fault. Introducing the derivative claims against Werner caused the fault split to jump to 84% Ali/Werner and 16% the other driver.
The court of appeals in this case held that since the plaintiffs pled gross negligence, the admission rule would not apply, regardless of whether the court formally adopted it. On this point, Justice Young’s concurrence warned that trial courts should be “very cautious” about using a mere allegation of gross negligence “as a basis to honor the admission rule in theory but defeat it in practice.” In fact, Justice Young suggested that a plaintiff that pleads gross negligence as a way to get around the admission rule must show legally sufficient evidence of gross negligence. He noted he would be inclined to remand a case for a new trial if a gross negligence claim, which formed the basis for disregarding the admission rule, turned out to have been ill-founded.
Texas’ Highest Court Continues to Stem the Tide of Large Verdicts
This ruling carries significant implications for defendants in personal injury suits across Texas. By providing a clear standard of substantial causation, this decision poses a challenge to plaintiffs pursuing claims against corporate defendants who were involved peripherally or marginally in an accident, even outside of the trucking realm. Chief Justice Jimmy Blacklock made it clear – plaintiffs must demonstrate more than just the presence of corporate defendants or their employees at the scene of an accident. Mere “but for” negligence is insufficient; the negligence must be an “active and efficient” cause of the resulting injury. Regardless of verdict amount, courts of appeal should be looking very closely at the entire definition of negligence and a defendant’s role in the incident before a defendant will be financially liable.
Additionally, it appears to be only a matter of time before Texas courts formally adopt the admission rule. In the meantime, corporate defendants should be vigilant in addressing gross negligence claims given the court’s latest ruling, as these can circumvent the admission rule’s protections. Justice Young’s warning indicates that courts may examine such claims with increased scrutiny, as seen in Werner.
The Texas Supreme Court as a whole also continues its prior skepticism of “negligent entrustment,” “negligent supervision” and “negligent training” claims against corporate defendants.
It’s important to analyze how a party is actually connected to an incident. Moving forward, defendants have the clear and concise opinions in Werner to offer clarity on legal arguments when a party was peripherally involved in an accident, just so happened to be at the wrong location at the wrong time, or had little to do with the overall cause of the accident.
Please contact Michael Orlando Jr., Michael Carrer, Joshua Cargile or any member of the Phelps litigation team if you have questions or need advice or guidance.